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Reasonable royalties have become the primary form of relief in patent infringement lawsuits. Once a
patent is found valid and infringed, royalties are calculated based on a hypothetical license
negotiation between the patent owner and infringer said to take place at the moment infringement
began. The calculations seek to arrive at a royalty amount the parties would have agreed upon had
an actual license been negotiated. But there is disagreement among courts as to what information
should inform the royalty amount. Some take the hypothetical negotiation literally and disallow
post-infringement information from entering the calculations because such information would have
been unknown to parties in an actual negotiation. Yet other courts view the hypothetical negotiation
figuratively and allow both pre- and post-infringement information to play roles in arriving at a
royalty amount. This comment examines the contradictive reasoning used by courts and proposes a
set of judicial rules that, if applied, would aid in keeping reasonable royalty awards aligned with the
statutory requirements of reasonableness and adequate compensation, while also helping to make
damage
awards
more
predictable.
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ARE ROYALTIES REASONABLE IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUITS? USING
HINDSIGHT AT THE HYPOTHETICAL NEGOTIATING TABLE
MICHAEL J. CARROZZA*
INTRODUCTION
Meet Karl. Karl is an avid fisherman who devoted the last twenty years of his
spare time designing the first self-propelled fishing lure.1 After two hundred
prototypes and more than a thousand weekends later, Karl’s relentless efforts paid
off when he secured a patent on this revolutionary technology last year.2 Sadly
though, Karl depleted his savings account securing the patent and so far, no
investors have bit the hook.3
Enter Borderline Infringers, Inc. (“BI”). Last year, BI discovered Karl’s progeny
among thousands of newly issued patents4 and took interest in selling self-propelled
fishing lures. BI commenced manufacturing after its analyst forecasted profits
ranging from $750,000 to $1,000,000 within the first year of production.5 In
response, Karl filed an action against BI for patent infringement. If successful, he
* © Michael J. Carrozza 2012. J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School,
Chicago, IL. Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, summa cum laude, Illinois Institute of
Technology. Registered patent agent. I would like to thank Professor Maureen B. Collins for her
wisdom and guidance, and for tolerating my stubbornness. I would also like to thank the RIPL
editorial board for their hard work in bringing this comment to publication, and my family for all
their support. Most of all, I would like to thank my lovely wife, Elaine, for her unwavering support
and encouragement throughout all of law school. Without her, this comment would not be possible.
And to Mia, my beautiful dauther, you have made my life complete. Any mistakes in this comment
are my own.
1 See PAUL QUINNETT, DARWIN’S BASS: THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF FISHING MAN 170
(1996) (explaining that fishing lure designers strive to make a lure that “looks like, floats like,
moves like, smells like and even tastes like the real thing” in order to fool fish).
2 This is a fictitious narrative about a fisherman and his dream and does not represent true
characters or events. Fishing lures with propulsion mechanisms are not new technology. In fact,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office has issued many patents directed towards such
technology. See Moisture Activated Self-Propelled Fishing Lure, U.S. Patent No. 5,335,442 (filed
Nov. 13, 1992) (issued Aug. 9, 1994); Fishing Lure, U.S. Patent No. 5,035,075 (filed May 23, 1989)
(issued July 30, 1991); Animated Fishing Lure, U.S. Patent No. 4,581,841 (filed June 17, 1985)
(issued Apr. 15, 1986); Fishing Lure, U.S. Patent No. 4,038,773 (filed Mar. 22, 1976) (issued Aug. 2,
1977); Fishing Lure, U.S. Patent No. 3,791,064 (filed Apr. 10, 1972) (issued Feb. 12, 1974).
3 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498
(2001) (estimating the cost of prosecuting a patent from start to finish to be between $10,000 and
$30,000); Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/id=14668/ (explaining the impact that
“[t]he type of invention and the degree of complexity” have on prosecution costs).
4 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT STATISTICS (June 2011), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf. In 2010, the USPTO granted 219,614
utility patents, 22,799 design patents, 981 plant patents, and 947 reissued patents. Id. In total,
244,341 patents issued in 2010. Id.
5 See Am. Sportfishing Ass’n, Angler Expenditures by Category in 2006, ASAFISHING,
http://www.asafishing.org/statistics/saleco_trends/expend_category.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
According to one source, anglers in 2006 spent over $45 billion in retail sales nationwide, with over
$900 million being spent on fishing lures, flies & artificial baits alone. Id.
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will be awarded reasonable royalties, a measure of damages for a patentee who does
not sell a product embodying his invention.6
Now, to what extent should Karl’s recovery depend on BI’s success or lack
thereof? Consider three possible outcomes from BI’s endeavor: (1) the lures
malfunctioned after only ten uses and led to dismal sales;7 (2) BI made quality lures
and achieved its forecasted profits;8 or (3) a solar storm destroyed every electronic
device on Earth and compelled millions to take up fishing, which led to windfall
profits.9
Courts disagree about what information should be used to calculate reasonable
royalties in similar but vastly more complex scenarios.10 Some would have Karl’s
recovery based solely on BI’s sales projections, while others would allow
consideration of all events that occurred.11 Such disagreement has led to a dangerous
environment, one where contradictive binding precedent lurks12 and large damage
awards have become commonplace.13 This comment proceeds by first explaining the
background of reasonable royalties and evidence used in the calculations. In part II,
Karl reappears and his infringement suit is analyzed under opposing Federal Circuit
precedent. Part III proposes a set of rules to treat potentially relevant information
that would lead to more uniform judgments and adequate damage awards.

See infra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (considering
plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s defective product led to poor sales).
8 See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling U.S., Inc., 699 F.3d
1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding substantial evidence to support a jury award for reasonable
royalties).
9 See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (D. Del.
2005) (permitting unforeseeable events of September 11, 2001 to be considered in damage
calculations).
10 See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727, 730 (2010); Linkco, Inc.
v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the inconsistency among courts
regarding admissible evidence for reasonable royalty calculations).
11 Compare Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (basing royalty award solely on pre-infringement sales projection), with Harris Corp. v.
Ericsson, Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s interpretation of
precedent to consider events occurring after infringement began).
12 Honeywell Int’l, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (“Therefore, the court is presented with two cases
[from the Federal Circuit], both of which are binding, that dictate opposite results.”).
13 See, e.g., Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08 CV 88, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36451, at
*43 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2011) ($625 million in reasonable royalties); Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc. v.
Abbott
Labs.,
No.
07-CV-139-TWJ
(E.D.
Tex.
June
29,
2009),
available
at
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/files/centocor.abbott.verdict.form.pdf (awarding $1.67 billion in total
damages, $504 million in reasonable royalties, and setting record for the largest damage award in
history of U.S. patent litigation); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (E.D.
Tex. 2009) ($200 million in reasonable royalties); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp.
2d 150, 160 (D.R.I. 2009) ($388 million in reasonable royalties); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (N.D.N.Y 2009) ($184 million in reasonable royalties); Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (S.D. Cal. 2008) ($358 million in reasonable
royalties); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d, 912, 940 (S.D. Cal. 2007) ($1.53
billion in reasonable royalties).
6
7
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I. BACKGROUND
This section begins with an introduction to reasonable royalties and the role
they play in patent infringement suits. Next, the intricacies of calculations are
explained. Finally, several cases are examined that expose a disagreement within
the Federal Circuit.
A. Remedies for Patent Infringement
The patent laws of the United States provide that “[a] patentee shall have
remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”14 The laws also provide for
both injunctive15 and monetary16 forms of relief. But, no matter how egregious an
infringer’s actions, and no matter how willful the infringement, the patent laws “do
not provide for criminal prosecution of infringement.”17
While the issuance of an injunction is efficacious to prevent further harm,
monetary relief restores the patent owner to a financial position he would have
enjoyed but for the infringement.18 Patent owners are made whole primarily through
compensatory damages,19 which take the form of either (1) lost profits20 or (2)
reasonable royalties.21 The form most appropriate is dependent on the particular
circumstances of the case.22
35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
Id. § 283.
16 Id. § 284.
17 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.01 (2012); see also Dowling v. United States,
473 U.S. 207, 227 (1985) (“Despite its undoubted power to do so, . . . Congress has not provided
criminal penalties for distribution of goods infringing valid patents.”).
18 Caprice L. Roberts, Business Law Forum: Intellectual Property Remedies: The Case for
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 674
(2010).
19 7 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 20.03; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
In addition to
compensatory damages, the court may award enhanced damages, attorney fees, interest and costs.
JOHN M. SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER S. MARCHESE & JOHN LAND, PATENT DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4:1 (2011).
20 Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269,
1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Lost profits are a form of damages available to patent owners who
manufacture or sell something embodying their invention and would have made additional sales,
charged higher prices for their product, or would have incurred less expenses but for the defendant’s
infringement. Id.; see also 7 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 20.05; Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d
1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[I]f the patentee is not selling a product, by definition there can be no
lost profits.”).
21 See Michael H. King & Steven M. Evans, Selecting an Appropriate Damages Expert in a
Patent Case; An Examination of the Current Status of Daubert, 38 AKRON L. REV. 357, 357 (2005).
Some commentators view compensatory damages as having three distinct forms: (1) lost profits, (2)
an established royalty or (3) a reasonable royalty. See, e.g., 7 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 20.03.
Strictly speaking, though, an established royalty is a one form of reasonable royalties based on the
first Georgia-Pacific factor. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“The royalties received by the patent owner for the licensing of the patent-in-suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.”).
22 7 CHISUM, supra note 17, § 20.03; see also Minco Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, 95 F.3d 1109,
1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming district court award of lost profits for one segment of infringing
sales and reasonable royalties for another segment of sales).
14
15
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B. Awarding Reasonable Royalties
When a patent is found valid and infringed and the owner is unable to prove lost
profits, the law provides that he is entitled to no “less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”23 The patent statutes are
devoid of any specific methodology to calculate reasonable royalties and trial courts
are free to exercise their discretion in adopting a method.24
But, freedom
notwithstanding, one of two methods is used in nearly every reasonable royalty
calculation—the “analytical” approach or the “willing-licensor, willing-licensee”
approach.25
1. An “Analytical” Approach
The analytical approach is the least used,26 but arguably the most
straightforward method to calculate reasonable royalties.27 It is best illustrated in
TWM Manufacturing v. Dura Corp.28 There, the infringer had memorialized, in a
memorandum, a projection of 52.7% gross profits from the proposed infringing
sales.29 The special master, deciding the issue of damages, subtracted the infringer’s
overhead expenses from the projected profits to arrive at a projected net profit
between 37% and 42%.30 Leaving the infringer an industry standard net profit, the
patentee was awarded the remainder, about 30%, in reasonable royalties.31
23 35 U.S.C. § 284.
An unfortunate and often overlooked nuance of section 284 is that
reasonable royalties can define two different types of recovery. SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19,
§ 3:2. The first defines a statutory minimum that the Federal Circuit has described as “merely the
floor below which damages shall not fall.” Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1983). This is an amount corresponding to what the infringer and patent owner would
have negotiated had there been an actual licensing agreement. Id. The Sixth Circuit recognized the
obvious danger in this type of award. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d
1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding that “the infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to
gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid.”).
The second definition refers to any portion of actual damages that cannot be proven as lost
profits. See Info. Res., Inc. v. Test Mktg. Grp., Inc., Nos. 93-1227, 93-1228, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
34021, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 27, 1993). By virtue of this second meaning, royalties are often awarded
in amounts much greater than the statutory minimum. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65
F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
24 Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
25 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
26 See id.
27 See SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:8.
28 TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
29 Id. at 899.
30 Id.
31 Id. The simplicity of this method derives from its mechanical nature, but implicit is the
requirement of evidence reflecting the infringer’s projected profits before infringement began. See
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. The analytical approach is reminiscent of a watered-down version of
profit disgorgement, which was the primary means of patent compensation prior to 1946. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 67, 70 (1946) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 284 (2012)) (“[U]pon a decree being
rendered in any such case for an infringement, the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in
addition to profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained
thereby.”) (emphasis added).
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2. “Would you Like a License for that Infringement?”
A far less mechanical but more frequently used method to calculate reasonable
royalties is the “willing-licensor, willing-licensee” approach.32
a. Who, What, and When?
Using this approach, the patentee and infringer are presumed to be prudent
parties who engage in a hypothetical license negotiation and reach an agreement in
lieu of the actual infringement.33 Because the infringer is liable for all use made of
the invention,34 the first step is to ascertain the date infringement began and to
designate it the time when the hypothetical negotiation took place.35
Next, the type of license the hypothetical negotiators would have agreed upon
must be determined.36 Although license agreements can be structured many
different ways, two common forms are the lump-sum license and running royalty
license.37 Under a lump-sum agreement, the licensee (infringer) pays the licensor
(patent owner) an upfront amount for full use of the patent during a specified term.38
In contrast, a running royalty license consists of a royalty base and a royalty rate.39
The base reflects the amount of infringing units embodying the subject matter of the
patent and is usually expressed in dollars.40 The royalty rate is the percentage of the
base that the licensee pays the licensor for using the patent.41

32 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
The complexity of this method derives from its many
variables. See Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The
inherent difficulty in the approach has been described as “seeming often to involve more the talents
of a conjurer than those of a judge.” Id.
33 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. Some have criticized this approach as imposing a compulsory
license “against the will and interest of the person wronged, in favor of the wrongdoer.” Monsanto
Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
34 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
35 Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
36 SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:13; see also Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325 (stating the
hypothetical negotiation tries to describe the resulting licensing agreement).
37 See SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:13; see also Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326 (explaining the
significant differences between running royalties and lump sum agreements).
38 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326.
39 SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:13.
40 Id. Note, however, that if the infringer does not sell a product embodying the patented
invention, the royalty base will be expressed in different terms. Id. For example, if infringing
products are manufactured but not sold, the number of products will form the base. Id. If the
claimed invention is a process, the amount of use will become the royalty base. Lucent, 580 F.3d at
1326.
41 SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:13.
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b. The Georgia-Pacific Factors
Reasonable royalties are difficult to calculate in part because of myriad factors
parties contemplate during real negotiations.42 At trial, most energy will be spent
by the judge or jury to decide a royalty rate the parties would have agreed to.43 But
this is not all guesswork. Triers of fact are guided by Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp.,44 which outlined a non-exclusive list of fifteen factors that represent
relevant evidence of royalty rates and royalty bases.45
C. Hindsight at the Hypothetical Negotiating Table
Most reasonable royalty calculations involve only a few, and often the same,
Georgia-Pacific factors.46 Of particular importance to this comment is the eleventh
factor, which considers “The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.”47
A careful reading of this factor reveals an inherent discrepancy with the overall
premise of the willing-licensor, willing-licensee approach.48
The approach is
predicated on a hypothetical license negotiation said to take place just before the
moment of infringement.49 Yet this factor introduces evidence based on events
subsequent to infringement, events “that could not have been known to or predicted

42 Id.
Courts and commentators have recognized the difficulties in calculating reasonable
royalties for decades.
See generally EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 172–75 (1951) (explaining that there is no way to determine what
royalties would be reasonable); Mathey v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 54 F. Supp. 694, 698–99 (D.
Mass. 1944). The difficulty is due in part because patents inherently cover very broad and
dissimilar areas of technology. See Katie Lula, How to See a jar of Peanut Butter: Evaluating
Empirical Studies of Patents and Patent Law, 7 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 151, 166 (2007).
The mental gymnastics that courts and juries have to play when calculating reasonable
royalties have not gone unnoticed by Congress. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th
Cong. § 6 (providing guidance to courts on what evidence would be most relevant); Patent Reform
Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5; Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5
(proposing how evidence should be analyzed); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5;
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5; Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th
Cong. § 4 (as reported by Mr. Leahy, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009) (proposing a guide to
relevant evidence, a methodology to calculate reasonable royalties, a definition for willful
infringement, and when enhanced damages should be warranted). Despite these attempts by
Congress to refine the reasonable royalties calculus, the America Invents Act was passed without so
much as a single change to § 284. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
43 See, SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:13 (pointing out that the fifteen Georgia-Pacific
factors are more relevant in determining a rate than a base).
44 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
45 See Monsanto Co. v. Hargrove, 4:09-CV-1628 (CEJ), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128416, at *6–7
n.1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2011) (listing the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors).
46 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
1, 38–39 (2001).
47 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
48 Id.
49 Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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by the hypothesized negotiators.”50 This seeming paradox was addressed in Sinclair
Refining Co. v Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.51
1. “Book of Wisdom”
In Sinclair Refining, the plaintiff, Jenkins Petroleum, filed a breach of contract
claim for Sinclair’s failure to assign Jenkins a patent application.52 Jenkins
thereafter filed a motion to compel discovery, seeking information to assess damages
that related to the extent the patent was used, the number of devices manufactured
under the patent, and the amount of products the devices yielded.53 The district
court found the information irrelevant because damages were to be assessed at the
time of breach, and here, Jenkins was seeking information subsequent to the
breach.54
On appeal, Justice Cardozo recognized that the breach occurred when the patent
first issued and that its value at that time did not reflect its utilitarian value later
assumed.55 To adequately compensate the plaintiff for the harm suffered,56 Cardozo
held that “[after years have gone by since a patent issues,] experience is then
available to correct uncertain prophecy. Here is a book of wisdom that courts may
not neglect. We find no rule of law that sets a clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to
look within.”57
2. The Pre- and Post-Negotiation Controversy
Courts view the hypothetical negotiation differently, resulting in disagreement
as to what evidence should be admissible to calculate reasonable royalties. Some
appear to interpret the hypothetical negotiation literally while others appear to view
it as a mere figurative construct.58 As a corollary, the former refuse to allow postnegotiation information into the calculations while the latter welcome it.59

Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689 (1933).
52 Id. at 691.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 690–91.
55 See id. at 697 (“A patent is a thing unique. There can be no contemporaneous sales to
express the market of an invention that derives from its novelty its patentable quality.”).
56 See id. at 699 (“An imaginary bid by an imaginary buyer, acting upon the information
available at the moment of the breach, is not the limit of recovery where the subject of the bargain is
an undeveloped patent.”).
57 Id. at 698.
58 Compare Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D.
Del. 2005) (considering a literal interpretation), with Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853
F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (viewing the hypothetical negotiation figuratively).
59 Compare Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D.
Del. 2005) (emphasizing information available to the parties at the time of negotiation), with
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (allowing postnegotiation information).
50
51
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a. Literally, Hypothetically Speaking
Courts aligning with the literal interpretation premise their refusal on the
unavailability of post-negotiation information during an actual licensing
agreement.60 For example, the damage award in Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite
Pictures, Inc.61 was based on sales projections found in the defendant’s business plan
dated two months before infringement began.62 On appeal, the defendant argued
that evidence of actual sales proved the projections to be speculative and optimistic.63
The court, however, found the actual sales to be immaterial because they would have
been unknown at the time of infringement.64
A similar post-negotiation barrier was erected in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v.
Merck KGaA,65 a case set in the mid-1990s when biotechnology was rapidly
developing.66 It was unclear from the record whether infringement began in 1994 or
1995.67 The plaintiff’s damages expert proffered a hypothetical license based in part
on the defendant’s 1995 expectations of obtaining FDA approval.68 Referencing to
the “hypothetical negotiation” sixteen times, Judge Rader emphatically rejected this
hypothetical license and remanded to the lower court to determine exactly when
infringement began.69 He reasoned that a 1994 infringement would preclude
consideration of the 1995 FDA approval and technological progress, two postnegotiation factors affecting the parties’ risks and expectations.70
b. Figuratively Speaking, That Is
Yet other courts embrace Justice Cardozo’s “book of wisdom” and permit all
evidence, pre- and post-negotiation. This was made exceptionally clear in Fromson v.
Litho Plate & Supply Co.,71 where the court described the hypothetical negotiation as
encompass[ing] fantasy and flexibility; fantasy because it requires a court to
imagine what warring parties would have agreed to as willing negotiators;
flexibility because it speaks of negotiations as of the time infringement
began, yet permits and often requires a court to look to events and facts

60

2005).

See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Del.

Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1384.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1385; see also Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(vacating damage award because none of the evidence “reflected what the parties might have agreed
to . . . at the time the infringement began.”) (emphasis added).
65 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
66 See id. at 870.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 869–72.
70 Id. at 870.
71 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
61
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that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or predicted
by the hypothesized negotiators.72
One district court was faced with the opposing rules of Integra and Fromson in a
rather unusual case.73 Honeywell and HSC compete in the aerospace industry.74 In
1998, HSC secured a contract to sell a Brazilian jet manufacturer 609 power units by
2017.75 Thereafter, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, unexpectedly increased
the demand for HSC’s power units.76 By 2004–05, new sales projections indicated
HSC would sell over 1000 units by 2017.77 However, HSC’s power unit infringed
Honeywell’s patent as of March 2000.78 The court acknowledged that the 2004–05
projections would have been unavailable at a March 2000 hypothetical license
negotiation.79 Nonetheless, the projections were allowed and both Sinclair Refining
and Fromson were cited for support while Integra was dismissed for its rigid
barrier.80
II. ANALYSIS
Reasonable royalties must be adequate yet somewhat predictable.81
Undercompensation in patent infringement could lead to reduced incentives to
innovate.82 At the same time, overcompensation can “distort competition among
technologies and deter innovation by raising costs and risks for innovators.”83 Under
current patent jurisprudence, Karl’s recovery ostensibly will depend not only on the
facts, but also the court. This section first explores why courts treat the hypothetical

72 Id. at 1575. This was echoed in ResQNet.com, where the Federal Circuit instructed the
district court on remand to “consider the panoply of ‘events and facts that occurred [after
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also
infringement].’”
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[N]either precedent nor
economic logic requires [the court] to ignore information about how often a patented invention has
been used by infringers.”).
73 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Del. 2005).
74 Id. at 462.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 463.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 469.
80 Id.
81 See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1665–66 (2010) (arguing that patent damage
awards have become so unpredictable because of the complexity of patent cases and a lack of
uniform guidance in applying the Georgia-Pacific factors).
82 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES
WITH
COMPETITION
179
(Mar.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 FTC REPORT].
83 Id.; see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 626 (2008) (“[T]he primary
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.”).
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negotiation differently.84 Then, Karl’s infringement suit is analyzed under opposing
Federal Circuit precedent.
A. The Balancing Act
Courts reject post-negotiation information in reasonable royalty calculations on
the premise that it would be unknown during an actual negotiation.85 But should
unknown information matter? After all, the hypothetical negotiation is only a
judicial construct developed to assist in the damages calculus.86 The hypothetical
negotiation is not inscribed in statute. But, what is inscribed in statute is the
requirement to award “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . .”87
What emerges from the differing interpretations, then, is a balancing act between
perspectives from which to view adequate compensation: the hypothetical parties’
using foresight or the trier’s using hindsight.88

84 See Laura B. Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 95, 95 (1991). The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in part to provide “a forum that
[would] increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.” S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15, 1981 WL 21373. Yet, despite this goal, infringement
damages remain inconsistent partly because the Federal Circuit has failed to articulate clear
standards. Pincus, supra, at 95.
85 See Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 518–19 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (vacating
damage award because plaintiff’s damages expert considered evidence of events that occurred after
the date of first infringement); Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (vacating damage award that depended only on post-negotiation information that would have
been unknown at the time of infringement).
86 Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933) (“The whole
notion of a reasonable royalty is a device in aid of justice . . . .”); see also Horvath v. McCord Radiator
& Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335 (6th Cir. 1938) (describing for the first time the willing-licensor,
willing-licensee concept as a means to calculate reasonable royalties); Interactive Pictures Corp. v.
Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (referring to the hypothetical negotiation
as a “conceptual framework”).
87 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
The statute also says, “but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty . . . .” Id. This language makes reasonable royalties appear as a “floor” for recovery. See
supra text accompanying note 23. The Federal Circuit has observed that a reasonable royalty award
could include an amount greater than the statutory minimum in order to “adequate[ly] compensate
for the infringement.” See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:2 (“What is always awarded (no matter what it is called) is
‘damages adequate to compensate’ the patent owner.”). In this comment, I focus on adequate
compensation rather than a ground floor for recovery.
88 See SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:2. The Federal Circuit is primarily concerned with
whether the patentee is adequately compensated for the infringement. Id.; see also Integra
Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ascertaining exactly when
infringement began was “essential for properly assessing damages”). The method used to calculate
damages is ancillary to this primary concern and explains why courts strive to award adequate
compensation, yet diverge in how they arrive at it. SKENYON ET AL., supra note 19, § 3:2.
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1. Using Foresight
One of the courts responsible for erecting the post-negotiation barrier was
Interactive Pictures.89 The court dismissed evidence of actual sales while placing
great emphasis on the availability of the defendant’s business plan “at the time of the
hypothetical negotiation.”90 Though it is unclear to what extent, the type of license at
issue may have played a role. The plaintiff’s damages expert opined, and the court
accepted, that the parties would have negotiated a five-year lump-sum agreement.91
If this had in fact occurred, the licensee would have paid the agreed royalty amount
before any sales ever took place,92 thus, foreclosing the licensee’s ability to
reevaluate the usefulness and value of the patent given actual sales.93
But no discussion of license type appears in Integra Lifesciences.94 Instead, the
dominating factors were the nascent state of RGD peptide research in 1994 and the
potential for FDA approval in 1995.95 Although it was unclear when infringement
began, some evidence seemed to indicate 1994.96 Both the FDA approval and rapid
technological progress being made would have been both unknown and unforeseeable
to the parties in 1994.97 Rejecting these unlikely events for hypothetical purposes
would seem logical, then, if adequate compensation was limited to knowledge within
the parties’ foresight.98

Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1385.
91 Id. at 1384 (“We have previously upheld awards of damages premised on a lump sum royalty
payment based on an infringer’s expected sales.”). Whether the reference to “lump sum” is made
here merely because it was the license type being discussed or because the court’s holding depended
on it is unclear.
92 See sources cited supra note 37.
93 Id.; see Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (“The fact that Infinite did not subsequently
meet those projections is irrelevant to Infinite’s state of mind at the time of the hypothetical
negotiation.”). This is an important distinction between running royalties and lump-sum, paid-upfront royalties. Under a lump-sum license, the licensee bears the majority of risk because the
licensor receives payment irrespective of whether the license was profitable or even used. See
RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 7:04 (2008). A running royalty
shifts some of the risk to the licensor who receives only a percentage of some base from the licensee,
where the base might depend on number of units produced, sold, gross revenue, or the like. Id. In
this sense, the actual market decides the value of the license. Id. If the licensee observes a failure,
he can cease use of the license and payment to the licensor. Id.
If the parties in Interactive Pictures had agreed to a running royalty license, the defendant
would have had wider latitude to control the royalties paid once it observed that it was not going to
meet its sales projections. Perhaps the defendant’s inability to control royalties once a lump-sum is
paid is the reason why the Interactive court precluded evidence of actual sales.
94 Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
95 See id. at 870.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. (“Thus, the record does not clearly indicate whether 1994 or 1995 is the proper date
for the first infringement. If indeed the record shows that the first infringement occurred in 1994,
then the hypothetical negotiation should be regarded as having occurred at least before [the
potential for FDA approval].”).
89
90
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Predicting how courts would hold given alternative facts is not an exact
science.99 Rather than prognosticate, I have offered explanations for why the
Interactive Pictures and Integra courts chose foresight over hindsight.100
2. Using Hindsight
When adequate compensation is based on all events, whether pre- or postnegotiation, what the parties could foresee at the hypothetical negotiation becomes
less important than the trier’s hindsight.101 Both Fromson and Honeywell Int’l, Inc.
v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. illustrate this proposition.102 The district court in
Fromson awarded a reasonable royalty based on an industry standard profit of ten
percent.103 The court then held that a willing licensee would have agreed to a
royalty comprising one quarter of its profits.104 The Federal Circuit found these
percentages arbitrary.105 It instructed the district court on remand, that if it was to
consider the infringer’s actual profits, it could fix a reasonable royalty accordingly.106
Here, the appellate court was permitting the lower court to use hindsight to
formulate a reasonable royalty that would adequately compensate the plaintiff.107
Hindsight was even more prevalent in Honeywell.108 Recall that infringement
began in 2000, events in 2001 drastically changed the aircraft industry, and sales
projections in 2004 showed a sixty percent increase in demand for the infringing
products.109 Arguably, the events of September 11, 2001, were even less foreseeable
than the potential for FDA approval in Integra, yet the Honeywell court allowed the
2004 post-negotiation sales projections into evidence.110 Among its reasons was that
“it [would] permit[] a damage award more in keeping with the plain language of

99 See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Calculation of a
reasonable royalty depends on the particular facts of each case.”).
100 See Linkco, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (suggesting the
Interactive Pictures holding depended on the availability of pre-infringement sales projections and,
absent that data, would have set a royalty rate and used actual sales); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v.
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Del. 2005) (suggesting Integra holding
would have allowed post-negotiation information to test the reasonableness of pre-negotiation
assumptions, which depended on the foreseeability of intervening events).
101 See, Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also,
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 480 (D. Del. 2005).
102 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Honeywell Int’l,
Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 480 (D. Del. 2005).
103 Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1577.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1578.
106 Id.
107 Id. It should be noted that the Federal Circuit gave the lower court “liberty to craft a
royalty on such bases as it may deem most fair.” Id. Rather than using hindsight to fix a
reasonable royalty, the lower court could also have elected to receive expert testimony on what
would be reasonable given the circumstances. Id. at 1579.
108 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 480 (D. Del. 2005).
109 Id. at 463.
110 Id. at 470.
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§ 284 by adequately compensating the plaintiff for the ‘use made of the invention’ by
the defendant.”111
B. Comparing the Effects of Foresight and Hindsight on Reasonable Royalties with a
Hypothetical
The hypothetical posed at the beginning of this comment centered around Karl,
a fisherman who spent his years designing a self-propelled fishing lure, obtained a
patent, and thereafter filed an infringement suit against Borderline Infringers, Inc.
(“BI”).112 Just before BI began infringing Karl’s patent, its analyst forecasted healthy
profits ranging from $750,000 to $1,000,000 within the first year.113
BI’s
infringement resulted in three possible outcomes: (1) dismal sales with no profits; (2)
moderate profits; or (3) windfall profits.114 Karl’s suit is now analyzed under
Interactive Pictures, Integra, and Fromson to compare how reasonable royalties
would be affected by admissible evidence.115
1. Dismal Sales
If we approach the hypothetical negotiation from a literal standpoint, Interactive
Pictures is the easy case. BI’s dismal sales will not be relevant to calculate a
reasonable royalty, and instead, its sales projections will be given full weight. Thus,
Karl’s recovery will be predictably substantial under Interactive Pictures.116
Integra presents a slight challenge if the court in fact chose foresight due to the
unforeseeability of post-negotiation events.117 Poor sales may have been within BI’s
Id. at 469–70.
See supra Intro.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 For purposes of this hypothetical, it is assumed that Karl’s patent was found valid and
infringed and only damages need to be determined. The analysis will focus on the eleventh GeorgiaPacific factor, that is, “evidence probative of the value of [the infringer’s] use.” Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). While it is indisputable that Karl’s
recovery will depend on several Georgia-Pacific factors, the goal of this analysis is to examine how
the limits of foresight or the use of hindsight impact Karl’s recovery generally. Although BI’s
infringement appears to be willful, I have purposely omitted any discussion of enhanced damages or
attorney fees for simplicity. Finally, Honeywell is not discussed here because it is not binding in the
Federal Circuit as it was a case from the District of Delaware. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Del. 2005).
116 See Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir.
2001). In Interactive Pictures, the court found the defendant’s failure to meet its sales projections
irrelevant for purposes of the hypothetical negotiation. Id. Nor did the failure imply that the sales
projections were speculative or based on guesswork. Id. These two reasons alone make this an easy
scenario to decide.
117 See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Del.
2005). The Honeywell court alludes to this reading of Integra. Id. It posits that under Integra, some
post-negotiation information may be used to test the reasonableness of the assumptions that would
be made at the hypothetical negotiation. Id. For support, it contends that the Federal Circuit
directed the district court to consider a 1995 license agreement and 1996 purchase of a company,
two events postdating a 1994 infringement. Id. But the Integra court used this information to check
111
112
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foresight. Perhaps internal tests indicated a high likelihood of failure or cheap
materials were used. But given only the present facts and holding of Integra, BI’s
actual sales would not be relevant because they would require hindsight.118 Using
only the parties’ foresight, then, it follows that BI’s failure will not reduce Karl’s
recovery.
Under Fromson, all evidence is relevant, whether pre- or post-negotiation.119
Despite large anticipated profits, BI’s low sales will negatively impact Karl’s
recovery, making the award under Fromson less than the awards anticipated under
Interactive Pictures and Integra.
2. Moderate Profits
If the scenario is changed slightly and BI achieves its forecasted profits, Karl’s
recovery will remain unchanged no matter the precedent relied upon because
achieved profits equal forecasted profits. For example, using foresight under
Interactive Pictures or Integra, BI’s forecasted profits will be considered while actual
sales will not, and will have no effect on Karl’s recovery because one equals the
other.120 Likewise, under Fromson, both forecasted profits and actual sales will be
considered, but because they are equal, there will be zero net effect.121
3. Windfall Profits
Assume now that a solar storm destroyed every electronic device on Earth and
compelled millions to take up fishing, which led to actual profits ten times what BI
had projected. The barrier to post-negotiation information under Interactive Pictures
will again render BI’s profits inadmissible.122 But, relying only on the hypothetical
the reasonableness of the jury’s verdict to determine whether it was adequately supported by the
record evidence. See Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Rather than directing the court to consider these events, it appears more of a test given the
standard of review. Id. at 872; see also Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil
Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A jury’s decision with respect to an award of damages
must be upheld unless the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the
evidence, or based only on speculation or guesswork.”).
118 See Integra, 331 F.3d at 870. This proposition is supported by examining other holdings
from Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In Riles, Judge Rader gave the bright-line rule that “A reasonable royalty
determination for purposes of making a damages evaluation must relate to the time infringement
occurred, and not be an after-the-fact assessment.” Riles, 298 F.3d at 1313. In that case, the
plaintiff’s damages expert based a reasonable royalty on the value of the defendant’s infringing oilrig platform at the time of trial and the first year of revenue generated by the platform. Id. at 1311–
12. Judge Rader held that the plaintiff’s damages expert’s models “did not reflect what royalty rate
a hypothetical negotiation between [the parties] would have yielded at the time the infringement
began.” Id. at 1313. This holding is consistent with Integra. See Integra, 331 F.3d at 870. Both
cases excluded the use of hindsight.
119 See supra Part I.C.2.b.
120 See supra Part II.B.1.
121 Id.
122 See supra Part II.B.1.
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negotiators’ foresight will preclude consideration of sales figures much larger than
anticipated profits. Without the larger sales in the calculations, Karl’s recovery
expectedly would be less than with the larger figures.
A very predictable outcome can be offered under Integra because of the
analogous facts.123 There, foresight was used because the post-negotiation events
were unforeseeable.124 Here, even if the solar storm was predictable, the sudden
interest in fishing was not, nor was BI’s amazing success. By rejecting actual sales,
the potentially positive effect that BI’s windfall profits could have on Karl’s recovery
will cease to exist.
But under Fromson, BI’s windfall profits would be admissible and would
positively impact Karl’s recovery.125 In fact, these are nearly the same facts as
Honeywell, which expressly adopted Fromson over Interactive Pictures and Integra.126
In that case, demand for the defendant’s infringing product rose precipitously due to
the unforeseeable events of September 11, 2001.127 The court chose hindsight and
allowed the post-negotiation information because it more adequately compensated
the plaintiff.128
C. Summary of Analysis129
Inconsistent holdings, such as Interactive Pictures and Fromson, supply parties
with too much ammunition and allow almost any argument to be made. If defending
infringement for a product that has not done well, the defendant will argue that the
only way to calculate reasonable royalties is to consider actual sales.130 If profits
were handsome, the defendant will argue that proof of actual sales would be
prejudicial because the parties could not have anticipated this at the hypothetical
negotiation.131
Plaintiffs are equally armed. When the infringer fails in the market, the
plaintiff will argue that actual sales do not reflect the pre-infringement value of the
patent; otherwise the defendant would not have bothered infringing.132 The plaintiff
might also argue that the infringer’s incompetence caused the low sales.133 However,

See supra text accompanying note 118.
See supra Part II.B.1.
125 Id.
126 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (D. Del. 2005).
127 Id. at 463.
128 Id. at 469–70.
129 Much was taken for granted in this analysis for simplicity and illustrative purposes.
Suppose BI never projected profits. The post-negotiation barrier would require courts operating
under Interactive Pictures and Integra to rely more heavily on other Georgia-Pacific factors. This is
untrue under Fromson because evidence of actual sales would still be admissible. Also, the analysis
considered the effect of using foresight and/or hindsight in a vacuum. Whether other GeorgiaPacific factors overlap with the eleventh factor was not examined here.
130 See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 516 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
131 See, e.g., Donnelly Corp. v. Gentex Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1126, 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
132 See, e.g., Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
133 See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
123
124
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when the infringement is profitable, the plaintiff will contend that evidence of actual
sales is the only true way to measure damages.134
The differing interpretations imputed to the hypothetical negotiation gives both
parties merit for their claims, but also create a high level of confusion.135 It is
axiomatic that adjudications be as predictable and as fair as possible.136 As a
plaintiff, Karl must have some certainty that, if successful, his award will outweigh
attorney’s fees. Given the current state of the doctrine, this is not so clear.
III. PROPOSAL
Potential variance in a patentee’s recovery that results from disagreement as to
whether hindsight information should be used or rejected in reasonable royalty
calculations is antithetical to the Federal Circuit’s creation.137 Most striking is that
different panels of the Federal Circuit apply the same test, strive for the same result,
and yet hold very differently. “Extensive litigation and a library of legal scholarship”
has emerged due to the vagueness of § 284 of The Patent Act and lack of guidance
afforded by the courts.138
This doctrinal instability could be quelled by several means. For example,
Congress could enact legislation to provide litigants and courts with clear guidance
as to how reasonable royalties are to be calculated.139 Alternatively, the United
States Supreme Court could grant certiorari and provide judicial precedent.140
Absent such measures, the Federal Circuit could hear or rehear an appeal en banc to
maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions.141
This section proposes a set of rules that depend on hindsight and describe how
potentially relevant information should be treated. A rationale for using hindsight is
first presented, which is then followed by the rules and accompanying explanations.

134

1984).

See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1566 (Fed. Cir.

See Linkco, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
See Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2009) (Colloton, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the dangers of conflicting opinions within circuit panels).
137 See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13 1981 WL 21373,
(“The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in
[the] area of [patent] law.”).
138 See Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel & Samantha Zyontz, Excessive or Unpredictable?
An
Empirical
Analysis
of
Patent
Infringement
Awards,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765891
(follow
“One-Click
Download”
hyperlink).
139 See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 12 (2007) (“The current damage statute is vague and provides
little guidance to judges or juries determining the proper damage award, particularly when the
award is based on the reasonable royalty standard.”); see also supra text accompanying note 42.
140 See, e.g., Infinite Pictures, Inc. v. Interactive Pictures Corp., 537 U.S. 825 (U.S. 2002)
(denying petition for writ of certiorari).
141 See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1); see also Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 011029, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7374 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2002) (denying petition for rehearing en banc);
Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 01-1553, 01-1569, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21340 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 25, 2002) (denying petition for rehearing en banc).
135
136
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A. Statutory Basis for Hindsight
Courts should not discount the probative nature of hindsight to measure
damages commensurate with the harm suffered. Substantive patent law prescribes
that a prevailing claimant should be awarded “damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer . . . .”142 Embedded within this statutory excerpt are
two concepts: adequate compensation for the infringement and a royalty that is
reasonable considering the infringer’s use of the patented invention.143 Both phrases
imply a single, simple, converging imperative, particularly, that claimants are to be
awarded damages that account for the total period of infringement.144
Courts invented the hypothetical negotiation as an instrument to carry out this
statutory imperative.145
But it does not correspond to reality.146 The negotiation
did not take place and no license exists.147 It is an emulation of what real parties
often do.148 It does not follow, then, that hindsight contravenes statutory law merely
because it disagrees with the judicially created hypothetical framework.149 On the
contrary, hindsight can play a crucial role in gauging the true harm suffered as a
result of actual events that materialized following infringement. This is not to say
the hypothetical negotiation should be abrogated. Without it, reasonable royalties
would be arbitrary. But it need not be taken literally to calculate adequate
compensation.150
Royalty awards must meet two constraints: reasonableness and adequacy.151
Reasonableness can be tested with hindsight by comparing a damage award to what
actually occurred.152 Adequacy can be measured with hindsight by considering
exactly how the defendant used and prospered from the patented technology. While
hindsight enables damages to be calculated within these constraints, some

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
144 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654–55 (1983).
145 TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The willing
licensee/licensor approach must be flexibly applied as a ‘device in the aid of justice.’).
146 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (referring to
the hypothetical negotiation as encompassing fantasy).
147 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The willingbuyer/willing-seller concept is employed by the court as a means of arriving at reasonable
compensation and its validity does not depend on the actual willingness of the parties to the lawsuit
to engage in such negotiations. There is, of course, no actual willingness on either side.”); see also
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (labeling the hypothetical
negotiation an “inaccurate” and “absurd” characterization).
148 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining
the similarities between an actual license negotiation and the hypothetical negotiation).
149 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). A much different situation would be presented if section 284
read, “but in no event less than a reasonable royalty based on a license that the parties would have
negotiated at the time of infringement.”
150 TWM Mfg., 789 F.2d at 899 (recognizing that courts are free to adopt any method to arrive
at a reasonable royalty amount so long as “that the figure compensate[s] for the infringement”).
151 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544.
152 See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 468 (D. Del.
2005).
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information may be highly prejudicial.153 The following rules set forth guidelines for
when hindsight information is appropriate. Taken from the wisdom of several courts,
the rules will best achieve the statutory imperative of adequate compensation that
accounts for the totality of infringement while remaining reasonable.
B. The Rules of Hindsight: How to Treat Potentially Relevant Information
Two broad categories of information have a temporal relationship with
infringement: (1) sales projections and (2) actual sales.154 The treatment of each
deserves independent consideration.
1. Sales Projections
RULE: Pre-infringement sales projections are always admissible.
Preinfringement sales projections do not require hindsight and are relevant to the
parties’ perceived value of the patent before infringement.155 These projections may
have served as a basis for the amount of infringing items manufactured, marketed, or
sold. If the parties were to have negotiated a license, the pre-infringement
projections undoubtedly would have helped establish a royalty rate.156 This
information is always admissible.
RULE: Post-infringement sales projections are admissible unless it can
be shown that infringement was known or contemplated. Post-infringement
sales projections necessarily fall into the category of hindsight.157 This information
may reflect the infringer’s business decisions in response to the market. If sales are
profitable, the infringer will project higher profits. If sales are stagnant, this too will
be reflected by the projections. However, if the infringer knows of or contemplates
infringement, projections may no longer reflect prudent business decisions but
instead may be influenced by anticipation of litigation. This information will then be
unreliable and highly prejudicial.158
2. Actual Sales
RULE: Actual sales are admissible, but lack of profits is not. When a
running royalty is chosen as the basis for an award, actual sales will be multiplied by
Linkco, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
See id. at 190–91.
155 Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 289 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
156 Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see
also Linko, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
157 See Linko, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
158 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469–70 (D. Del.
2005) (permitting the use of post-negotiation sales projections to most “adequately compensat[e] the
plaintiff for the ‘the use made of the invention’ by the defendant”). But see Linkco, 232 F. Supp. 2d
at 191 (rejecting sales projections not available until months after infringement began because they
could not have been known at the hypothetical negotiation).
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a royalty rate.159 What this rule refers to is the use of actual sales to set the actual
rate. Important events that unfold after infringement will be embodied within
evidence of actual sales.160 If unforeseeable events occur and sales skyrocket, the
infringer’s success should translate into a higher award for the injured patentee.161
Using hindsight, as shown under the Fromson analysis, can account for this positive
impact on the damages award.162
However, if the infringer does not profit, that information should be kept from
the calculus because numerous reasons, some having nothing to do with the value of
the patent, may explain the failure.163 Perhaps the infringer inefficiently brought the
product to market,164 or stockpiled manufactured products before sales were
attempted,165 or made an inferior product.166 Each reason would prove a lack of
profits to be too unreliable and highly prejudicial.167
CONCLUSION
Reasonable royalty awards have become the primary form of relief sought in
patent infringement suits, and for good reason.168 The patent statutes provide no
direction to calculate reasonable royalties and courts have inconsistently applied the
hypothetical negotiation approach.169 Such disorder diminishes predictability of
patent damages while furnishing lawyers with a gamut of arguments to be made,
limited only by their imagination.170 What remains is the potential to stifle or deter
innovation by reducing incentives to innovate and increasing costs and risks for
innovators.171 Of several factors used in royalty calculations, current jurisprudence
lacks certainty as to whether events occurring throughout infringement should
impact royalty rates. This comment offers a set of rules suggesting that most
information, including post-infringement, should be considered to adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the infringement.

159 See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., No. 93 C 6333, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12882, at *44 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 12, 1998).
160 See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933) (explaining
the “book of wisdom” concept).
161 See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
162 See supra Part II.B.3.
163 Linko, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 2d 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
164 See Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
165 See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (D. Del.
2005).
166 Linko, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 190.
167 Id.
168 See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11 n.42 (2008); see also 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 82, at 162
(discussing the “lottery-ticket mentality” of reasonable royalties).
169 See supra notes 10, 12, 84 and accompanying text.
170 See supra Part II.C.
171 See 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 82, at 179.

